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1. Introduction
Comparative statics is the source of a model’s testable implications,
it says how the model’s endogenous variables depend on its exogenous
parameters. In this paper I derive general comparative statics results
for a class of models where there are complementarities between the
model’s different endogenous variables, and between endogenous vari-
ables and exogenous variables. Many economic models fall in this class,
mainly because many economic models are games of strategic comple-
mentarities (Topkis 1979, Vives 1990). See Topkis (1998) and Vives
(1999) for economic examples.
To fix ideas, consider a collection of functions, indexed by T ⊂ Rn,
ft : [0, 1] → [0, 1], t ∈ T . Here ft is the reduced form of a model,
for example the best-response function of a game, and the fixed points
of ft are the equilibria of the model. I shall impose that endogenous
variables are complementary, which here means that ft is monotone
increasing for each t, and that there are complementarities between the
endogenous and exogenous variables, which here means that t 7→ ft(x)
is monotone increasing for each x. The problem is how to obtain a
monotone comparative statics conclusion: when t < t′ then the model’s
equilibria increase.
INSERT FIGURE 1
Figure 1
Consider the situation in Figure 1, where t, t′ ∈ T and t < t′. Assume
that ei is selected for t if and only if e
′
i is selected for t
′, a kind of
“local comparative statics” assumption. There are then three possible
comparative statics conclusions; two are monotone (e1 → e
′
1 and e3 →
e′3), and one is non-monotone (e2 → e
′
2).
The non-monotone comparative statics e2 → e
′
2 involves fixed points
that are unstable for dynamics xn = ft(xn−1). In this paper I prove
that—in models with complementarities—non-monotone comparative
statics must be selecting unstable fixed points.
Further, all monotone comparative statics involve stable fixed points,
as e1, e
′
1, e3 and e
′
3 are stable. In this paper I prove that this converse
result is also true in some generality. The converse requires comple-
mentarities, but also some additional regularity conditions.
In the rest of the Introduction, I shall place my results in the context
of existing results on comparative statics.
Samuelson (1947) presents comparative-statics methods that rely on
calculus, and smooth economic models. Samuelson’s “correspondence
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principle” (CP) says that, if one rules out unstable equilibria, one ob-
tains a local comparative statics conclusion—stable here means locally
stable for some out-of-equilibrium dynamics. In Figure 1, there are two
possible local comparative statics conclusions, but Samuelson’s CP pins
down exactly one.
A more recent approach is the comparative statics methods devel-
oped for models with complementarities (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts
(1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1994), Milgrom and Shannon (1994)).
This literature relies on lattice programming, and Topkis’s (1978) re-
sults on comparative statics for decision problems. In models with
complementarities there is a largest and a smallest equilibrium; and if
the exogenous parameters are complementary to endogenous variables,
then the largest and smallest equilibria increase as the exogenous pa-
rameter increases. Figure 1 illustrates this result: the smallest and
largest equilibria increase as we shift from t to t′.
The problem is that no equilibrium selection theory suggests that the
smallest or largest equilibria are good predictions. A possible justifica-
tion for focusing on these equilibria is that they have, in some models,
certain optimality properties. For example, in a network-externalities
model, or a coordination-failures model, the largest equilibrium is a
Pareto-optimal outcome. But the very reason we are interested in
these models is that Pareto inefficiencies may occur—e.g. in a network-
externalities model, we think that a new, superior, technology may not
be adopted by all players.
Echenique (2002), in turn, proves a strong version of the CP for
models with complementarities. Echenique’s result is: if e(t) is an
equilibrium for each t (so t 7→ e(t) is a selector of equilibria), t 7→ e(t)
is continuous and not monotone increasing, then, for all interior t, e(t)
is unstable for a broad class of out-of-equilibrium dynamics. Echenique
(2002) proves that, under some further restrictions, a converse result
is true: if t 7→ e(t) is monotone increasing, then it must select stable
equilibria.
The CP in Echenique (2002) does not explain the situation in Fig-
ure 1 because ftˆ for t < tˆ < t
′ can be such that there is no way of
connecting e2 and e
′
2 by a continuous selector. But both e2 and e
′
2 are
unstable for the dynamics xn = ft(xn−1). The “wrong” comparative
statics of going from e2 to e
′
2 selects unstable equilibria, but because
the comparison does not involve a continuous selector of equilibria,
Echenique’s version of the CP does not work.
The requirement of a continuous selector is an important drawback in
Echenique (2002) because it is difficult to guarantee that a continuous
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selector connects two fixed points. For example, consider Figure 1: how
can one guarantee that a continuous selector connects e2 and e
′
2?
In the present paper I prove a weak version of the CP in Echenique
(2002). The weak CP does not rely on continuous selections of equilib-
ria, but it cannot guarantee that all non-monotone comparative statics
selects unstable equilibria. Compared to Echenique (2002), I impose
more structure on X and x 7→ ft(x), and very little on T and t 7→ ft(x)
(Echenique requires T ⊂ Rn convex, here I only need T to be a partially
ordered set). The results in Echenique (2002) apply to multidimen-
sional endogenous variables, while this paper’s strongest results are for
one-dimensional endogenous variables. This is an important drawback,
but 1. there are models of interest with one-dimensional variables, like
two-player games and two-good general equilibrium models; 1 2. my re-
sults shed light on the role of multi- vs. one-dimensional variables in the
CP, they “explain” why one dimension helps in this context—famously,
Samuelson’s (1947) CP was discarded because it fails to hold with more
than one dimension (Arrow and Hahn 1971); 3. the CP presented here
is more general than Samuelson’s in models with complementarities,
and applies to a broad class of out-of-equilibrium dynamics.
2. The Correspondence Principle
2.1. Definitions. Let L be a Banach lattice; let L+ denote L’s positive
cone. For x, y ∈ L, say that x ≤ y if y−x ∈ L+, that x < y if x ≤ y and
x 6= y, and that x  y if y−x is an interior point of L+. Denote order
intervals by [x, y] = {z ∈ L : x ≤ z ≤ y}. Letting X be a subset of L,
a function f : X → X is monotone increasing if x < y implies that
f(x) ≤ f(y); it is strictly monotone increasing if x  y implies
that f(x)  f(y).
Definition 1. Let T be a partially ordered set. A family of functions
(ft : X → X | t ∈ T ) is an increasing family of continuous
functions if each ft is a continuous, monotone increasing function,
and if, for each x ∈ X, t 7→ ft(x) is monotone increasing.
In a family of functions, (ft : X → X | t ∈ T ), the set of fixed
point of ft is denoted by E(t) = {x ∈ X | x = ft(x)}. A fixed point
e(t) of ft is isolated if there is a neighborhood V of e(t) in X such
that V ∩ E(t) = {e(t)}.
Definition 2. Let f : X → X be a function. A sequence {xk} in X
is generalized adaptive dynamic from f starting at x ∈ X if
1General equilibrium with gross substitutes is a model with complementarities,
in the sense of this paper.
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x0 = x and there is some γ ∈ N such that
xk ∈ [f(inf {xk−γ , xk−γ+1, . . . xk−1}), f(sup {xk−γ , xk−γ+1, . . . xk−1})]
for all k ≥ 1; where by x−l I mean x0, for l = 1, . . . γ − 1.
To simplify notation, when a sequence {xk} is understood, I shall
denote {xk−γ, xk−γ+1, . . . xk−1} by H
γ
k —the history of length γ at k.
Let D(x0, f) be the set of all sequences that are generalized adaptive
dynamic from f starting at x0.
As an illustration of generalized adaptive dynamic, consider a Bertrand
pricing game with three firms, and let γ = 2. If firms 1 and 2 have
set prices (1,5) and (5,1) in the last two periods then, in a generalized
adaptive dynamic, firm 3 is “allowed” to set any price between its best
response to (1,1) and its best response to (5,5). So, it can set any price
between the best responses to the two extremal backward-looking con-
jectures about opponents’ play. For a discussion of this class of learning
processes, see Echenique (2000).
Definition 3. Let f : X → X be a function. A point xˆ ∈ X is
unstable for f if there is a neighborhood V of xˆ such that, for all x
in V , and all sequences {xk} ∈ D(x, φ), xˆ is not an accumulation point
of {xk}. A point xˆ ∈ X is stable for f if there is a neighborhood V
of xˆ in X such that, for all x in V and all sequences {xk} ∈ D(x, φ),
xˆ = limk xk.
Note that there is an asymmetry in these definitions—a point is not
unstable simply by failing to be stable. The asymmetry is because
trajectories in D(x0, f) are not uniquely defined by f .
2.2. Non-monotone comparative statics select unstable equi-
libria. In the following, L is a Banach lattice such that the interior of
L+ is non-empty, X ⊂ L is compact, and T is a partially ordered set.
Theorem 4. Let (ft : X → X | t ∈ T ) be an increasing family of
continuous functions, and fix t, t′ ∈ T with t < t′. Let e ∈ E(t),
e, e ∈ E(t′) with e < e and e  e. If @z ∈ E(t′) such that either
e < z < e or e < z < e, then e is unstable for ft′.
INSERT FIGURE 2
Figure 2
Why is Theorem 4 a comparative statics result? Consider Figure 2,
an example where L = R2. In part a), Theorem 4 implies that e is un-
stable. Thus, if one decides to refine away unstable equilibria, one can
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rule out the non-monotone comparative statics conclusion that selects
e when the parameter is t, and e when it is t′. In part b), Theorem 4
implies that e1, e2, and e3 are all unstable, but it is silent about e. So,
non-monotone comparative statics that goes from e to ei (i = 1, 2, 3)
is flawed, but we cannot say that all non-monotone comparative stat-
ics are wrong. In Section 2.3, I give a reason for selecting e: I give
conditions under which e is stable.
Figure 2 suggests that the most interesting application of the theo-
rem is when L is a chain, because when L is a chain we are always in
a situation like the one on part a). I give the application to L = R in
Corollary 5. Corollary 5 explains exactly the situation in Figure 1—
where stability yields a comparative statics conclusion without the need
to use calculus, or continuous selectors of equilibria.
Corollary 5. Let X = [a, b] ⊂ R, (ft : X → X | t ∈ T ) be an
increasing family of continuous functions, and t, t′ ∈ T with t < t′. If
e ∈ E(t), e /∈ E(t′) and e is the largest z ∈ E(t′) with z < e, then e is
unstable for ft′.
The proof of Theorem 4 exploits Dancer and Hess’s (1991) use of
topological index theorems in dynamical systems with the lattice struc-
ture that I have in this paper. In contrast, Echenique’s (2002) CP can
be interpreted as delivering a purely lattice-theoretical index theorem. 2
Proof of Theorem 4. By Dancer and Hess’s (1991) Proposition 1, either
there exist z in [e, e] arbitrarily close to e such that ft′(z) < z or there
exist z in [e, e] arbitrarily close to e such that z < ft′(z). I shall first
rule out the first possibility, then I shall argue that Dancer and Hess’s
result implies that e is unstable.
Let {xk} be the sequence defined by x0 = e, xk = ft′(xk−1), k ≥ 1.
By Theorem 3 in Echenique (2002), limk xk = inf {z ∈ E(t
′) : e ≤ z} ∈
E(t′). Now, e ∈ {z ∈ E(t′) : e ≤ z} so limk xk ≤ e, and there exist no
z ∈ E(t′) with e ≤ z < e because E(t′) ∩ [e, e] = {e, e}. So, lim xk = e.
Let W be a neighborhood of e with e < z for all z ∈ W , such
a neighborhood exists because e − e is an interior point of L+. Let
z ∈ W ∩ [e, e], and let {zk} be the sequence defined by z0 = z and
zk = ft′(zk−1), k ≥ 1. By induction, monotonicity of ft′ ensures that
xk ≤ zk ≤ e for all k. Then
e = lim
k
xk ≤ lim inf
k
zk ≤ lim sup
k
zk ≤ lim
k
xk = e.
2I thank Yakar Kannai for this interpretation.
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Now, for any z ∈ W , ft′ < z would imply that z is an upper bound on
the range of the sequence {zk}, constructed as before with z0 = z. This
is not possible, as e = limk zk. I have then ruled out the first possibility
in Dancer and Hess’s result.
Let V be a neighborhood of e. By Dancer and Hess’s Proposition
1, there is z ∈ V ∩ [e, e] with e < z < ft′(z). Let {zk} ∈ D(z, ft′).
I shall show by induction that z is a lower bound on {zk}. Let γ be
the bound on history implicit in {zk}. First, z ≤ w for all w ∈ H
γ
1 ,
and z < ft′(z) ≤ z1 so z ≤ inf H
γ
2 . Second, if z ≤ w for all w ∈ H
γ
k−1
then z ≤ inf Hγk−1 so z < ft′(z) ≤ zk. Then, z ≤ inf H
γ
k . Hence,
e < z ≤ lim infk zk, so e is not an accumulation point of {zk}, so e is
unstable. 
2.3. Monotone comparative statics select stable equilibria. I
show a partial converse to the CP: monotone comparative statics im-
plies stable equilibria. Stability from the comparative statics properties
of the selection of equilibria alone is a strong result; it comes at the
cost of imposing stronger monotonicity assumptions, and a regularity
condition on the selected equilibria.
Definition 6. Let f : X → X be a function. Say that a fixed point x
of f is regular if there is a neighborhood U of x such that
(1) U contains no other fixed points of f , and
(2) the existence of some y ∈ U with y  f(y)  x implies that
there is also z ∈ U with x  f(z)  z.
INSERT FIGURE 3
Figure 3
I call the requirement “regularity” because, when X ⊂ R it coincides
with the usual geometric notion of regularity—that f must cross the
diagonal at the fixed point x, not only intersect it. So, if X ⊂ R and f
is C1, that the Jacobian of f has full rank at x is equivalent to x being
regular. This is illustrated in Figure 3, part b). The first fixed point x1
of f is not regular because there are smaller points y arbitrarily close—
so that y > f(y) while the reverse inequality is not true for points close
to x1 that are larger. On the other hand, it is easy to see that x2 is
regular both in the usual sense and in accordance with the definition
above.
In general, though, regularity is stronger than the usual geometric
notion of regularity. For instance, consider Figure 3 a). The map
g : x 7→ x − f(x) in R2 is a counterclockwise smooth rotation of the
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unit disk that leaves the negative orthant (and 0) fixed but condenses
the positive orthant in the (0,−∞) × (0,∞)-cone and stretches the
(0,∞) × (0,−∞)-cone into the positive orthant. I have labeled the
intersection of these cones with the disk A,B,C and D so the picture
shows the action of the map. Clearly, this transformation can be made
as smooth as desired, and 0 is a 0 of g, i.e. a fixed point of f . Then, g
is a local diffeomorphism of 0, but 0 is not a regular point in the sense
used here, because while all elements y ∈ A satisfy f(y)  y, for all
z ∈ B, f(z) ≮ z.
Theorem 7. Let (ft : X → X | t ∈ T ) be an increasing family of
continuous functions, and fix t, t′ ∈ T with t < t′. Let e ∈ E(t),
e ∈ E(t′), e  e, and let ft′ be strictly increasing on [e, e]. Suppose
@z ∈ E(t′) such that e < z < e. If e  ft′(e), and e is regular, then e
is stable for ft′.
Proof. Let {xk} ∈ D(e, ft′) be defined by x0 = e, xk = ft′(xk−1),
k ≥ 1. It is easy to see by induction that {xk} is a strictly increasing
sequence, and that xk  e for all k. First, x0 = e  e implies that
x0 = e  ft′(e) = x1  ft′(e) = e, as ft′ is strictly increasing on [e, e]
and e  ft′(e). Second, if xk−2  xk−1  e, then ft′(xk−2) = xk−1 
ft′(xk−1) = xk  ft′(e) = e. Let U be the neighborhood of e in the
definition of regularity. By Theorem 3 in Echenique (2002), xk → e,
so there is K ∈ N such that xK ∈ U . Since xK  e, and e is regular
there is y ∈ U with e  ft′(y)  y. Let {yk} ∈ D(y, ft′), be defined
by y0 = y, yk = ft′(yk−1), k ≥ 1. By Theorem 3 in Echenique (2002),
yk → e.
I shall denote the interior of L+ by L+o. Since xK  e  y there are
open sets O1 and O2 with y − e ∈ O1 ⊂ L
+o and e − xK ∈ O2 ⊂ L
+o.
Let O = (y − O1) ∩ (xK + O2), so that O is an open neighborhood
of e. Let z ∈ O, then y − z ∈ L+o and z − xK ∈ L
+o, so we have
xK  z  y.
Finally, let {zk} ∈ D(z, ft′). It is easy to see by induction that
xK+k ≤ zk ≤ yk for all k ∈ N. (First, xK ≤ z0 ≤ y. Second if
xK+k−1 ≤ zk−1 ≤ yk−1, then ft′(xK) ≤ ft′(z) ≤ ft′(y)). This implies
that
e = lim
k
xk ≤ lim inf
k
zk ≤ lim sup
k
zk ≤ lim
k
yk = e.
Proving that for any z ∈ O, and any {zk} ∈ D(z, ft′), zk → e. 
Theorems 4 and 7 explain why the CP works in one-dimensional
models, even without using the Implicit Function Theorem (like in
Samuelson), or continuous selectors of equilibria. Let X = [a, b] ⊂ R,
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T =
[
t, t
]
⊂ Rn. Suppose that (x, t) 7→ ft(x) is C
1, ∂xft(x) ≥ 0, and
∂tft(x) > 0.
Corollary 8. There is Tˆ ⊂ T , T\Tˆ has Lebesgue measure zero, such
that, for all t, t′ ∈ Tˆ with t < t′, and any e ∈ E(t):
• e, the largest z ∈ E(t′) with z ≤ e, is unstable for ft′;
• e, the smallest z ∈ E(t′) with e ≤ z, is stable for ft′;
Corollary 8 is a simple consequence of Theorems 4, 7, and standard
results in differential geometry.
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